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Louisiana State University, for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
 
Abstract: Sir Halford Mackinder’s seminal contribution to classical geopolitics, Democratic Ideals 
and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, was published a century ago.  The book was 
written to influence the British delegation to the peace conference that was beginning in Versailles.  
Scant evidence suggests that he succeeded in this aim.  However, with the Second World War, and 
the United States’ participation in the conflict, Mackinder’s ideas found critical acclaim.  This 
centennial appreciation contends that many of the concepts he coined have relevance for today.  
Crucially, he identified two enduring features of democratic regimes that both explain and warn.  
First, in times of peace and prosperity, democracies refuse to think strategically until compelled to do 
so.   Second, political elites in these countries divorce their normative ideals for a rules-based 
international order from the existing and emerging geopolitical realities. 
 
he year 2019 marks the centenary of Sir Halford Mackinder’s important 
monograph Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction.1  
It was written in less than three months between December in 1918 and 
February 19192 in the aftermath of his penultimate general election campaign in the 
Glasgow constituency of Camlachie3 and the Versailles Peace Conference that 
opened in Paris on January 18, 1919. Mackinder’s book had two audiences: the 
primary one, the British delegation to the Peace Conference; and a secondary one, 
the politically aware British public.  His two-fold aim was to trace the historical, 
geostrategic roots of World War I and then advance geopolitical proposals designed 
to underpin a European reconstruction.  
 
1  The work was published by Constable in London and, almost simultaneously, by Henry 
Holt in New York. 
2 Torbjorn L Knutsen, “Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis,” The 
International History Review, vol 36, no. 5, 2014, p. 835.  On p. 855, Knutsen gives an insight to 
the compressed timelines Mackinder was working toward. 




2  | Orbis 
 
Mackinder continued working on his volume right up until the moment he 
submitted it to the publisher, writing a postscript that included an appendix in which 
he reprised the thesis of his book in the context of the Paris Peace Conference.  The 
postscript conveyed a flavor of campaign experience, in particular his encounters 
with the supporters of the opposition Socialist candidate, “young men with a burning 
faith in their eyes, though often without the full power of expressing their 
arguments—were at almost every meeting, boldly defensive of the Russian 
Bolsheviks.”4   
For Halford Mackinder, the dominance of the Russian Bolsheviks in the 
Eurasian “heartland” was an event of extraordinary significance for international 
relations.  According to Mackinder’s biographer, Brian Blouet, “He analyzed the 
weakness of the post–war world and argued that power was being centralized by 
large states.  Mass political movements were emerging, but populations would be 
manipulated by ruthless organizers controlling state machinery.”5 
In his appendix, Mackinder highlighted how, at the Peace Conference’s 
second plenary meeting on January 25, 1919, the unequal representation of the Great 
and Small Powers was determined.  French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau  
“pointed out that at the cessation of hostilities, the Great Powers had twelve million 
men on the field of hostilities; that they might have decided the future of the world 
on their own initiative; but that, inspired by their new ideals, they had invited the 
Smaller Powers to cooperate with them.”6  Mackinder insisted that international 
order still rested upon force, notwithstanding the juridical assumption of equality 
between sovereign states, whether great or small. 
Mackinder reminded his readers of a harsh truth: even at the Peace 
Conference, the allied powers insisted that the realities of force and power trumped 
the newly articulated ideals in the international arena, ideals that suggested a formal 
equality among nations and promoted institutions designed to advance their 
collective security, i.e., the proposed League of Nations.7 
The key reason for the enduring significance of Mackinder’s work derives 
from his presupposition that “Democracy must reckon with Reality.”8  Mackinder 
understood two essential features of democratic regimes: first, that during times of 
 
4 H.J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: Henry Holt, 1942), p. 202. 
5 Brian Blouet, Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 35 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
p. 650. 
6 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, pp. 207-208. 
7 Mackinder’s geopolitical advice—according to one modern “critical” commentator—found 
no traction in Paris.  See, Gerry Kearns in J. Agnew, K, Mitchell and G. Toal, eds., “Imperial 
Geopolitics,” A Companion to Political Geography (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), pp. 176-
177.  “Mackinder was not involved in the post war settlement of the political boundaries of 
Europe.  Other geographers were.  The place of Paul Vidal de la Blanche (1845-1918) in the 
French delegations and of Isaiah Bowman (1878-1950) in that of the United States was not 
extended to Mackinder by the British Government.  His blood and soil racism was dominant 
neither in the USA nor in Great Britain.  The official ideology of the war effort was more 
liberal.”   
8 This is taken from the final sentence of the book.  Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 
208.  
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peace and plenty, “Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until 
compelled to do so for purposes of defense”9; second, political elites in democracies 
often articulated their normative ideals for a rules-based international order divorced 
from the existing and emerging geopolitical and geostrategic realities. 
Mackinder’s geopolitical ideas represent a dualism between those concepts 
that are historically situated and unique to the 1918-1919 period and others that still 
have relevance a hundred years later.  His thought can be understood in light of two 
perspectives—substantive ones that emphasize trans-historical considerations and 
those of a contemporaneous nature.  
 
Mackinder: A British Polymath 
 
Mackinder’s concepts were a product of careers forged both within and 
beyond the academy.  He founded the School of Geography at Oxford in 1899, set 
up the University College of Reading in 1892 (which became the University of 
Reading in 1926), and was named the second Director of the London School of 
Economics (LSE) in 1903.  
Beyond these notable organizational achievements in academia, he was also 
responsible for establishing, on behalf of the War Office, a course for Army logistics 
officers10 at the LSE which ran, with the exception of the war years, from 1909 to 
1932.  The course design underscored his understanding of logistics and its role in 
projecting military power to specific geographical locations.  The curriculum 
encouraged and facilitated acquiring pertinent information and developing the 
imagination.  Army officers were then expected to apply both to the logistical and 
geostrategic challenges of their profession.   
In addition to his academic career, Mackinder contributed greatly to British 
public service.  Lord Curzon, then British Foreign Secretary, appointed him as British 
High Commissioner to South Russia (i.e., the anti-Bolshevik forces) in 1919.  He 
served in the House of Commons as a Scottish Unionist MP for the Camlachie 
constituency in Glasgow between 1910 and 1922; he was Chairman of the Imperial 
Shipping Committee, and member of both the Privy Council and the Royal 
Commission on Food Prices.11   
He recognized that his career had not been one of linear progression.  He 
wrote, “There is another kind of career I will describe as erratic and such a career has 
been mine, a long succession of adventures and resignations.  I do not admit to 
having been a rolling stone, because I have generally known where I was going—but 
I have certainly gathered no moss.”12  Mackinder’s experiences in higher education, 
 
9 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 23. 
10 See G.R. Sloan, “Haldane’s Mackindergarten: A Radical Experiment in British Military 
Education,” War in History, vol 19, no 2, 2012, pp. 322-352. 
11 W. H. Parker, Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 
pp. 51-52. 
12 H J Mackinder, “Dinner Speech, Imperial Economic Committee 13th May 1931,” 
Mackinder Papers, School of Geography, Oxford University. 
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military education, politics, public service, exploration, diplomacy, and policy 
formulation provided him with a series of experiences from which he deployed 
diverse  perspectives to evaluate the interplay of politics—both domestic and 
international—and geographical realities. 
 
Methodological Innovations and Intellectual Antecedents  
 
Although Mackinder never used the term “geopolitics,” we can discern the 
constituent elements of classical geopolitics throughout his work.  Geopolitics was 
and remains a synthesis of three disciplines: geography, history, and strategy.  The 
geographic element takes into account human factors: ethnic settlement patterns and 
conflict; and physical factors such as the location of resources and goods that are 
required for war, e.g. oil, minerals, and foodstuffs. The historical component 
acknowledges trajectories, cycles, and disruptions in the arenas of politics, economics, 
social relationships, technological innovation, and international affairs.  Finally, the 
strategic element provides an assessment of goals, means, and likely consequences of 
actions by one’s own state, its allies and adversaries, all undertaken during a conflict, 
potential or actual.  
Strategic thought was essential whenever a policymaker sought to alter the 
political, economic, and/or military terrain in favor of his nation-state by deploying 
force, engaging in intelligence and diplomacy, and securing new alliances.  The 
history of previous conflicts, the terrain over which conflicts take place, the tactics 
adversaries deployed, and the location, culture, and capabilities of any enemy—all 
factored into the formulation of a grand strategy on which foreign policy should be 
based.13  
Mackinder also can be credited with developing what he called a “new 
geography.”  He viewed the discipline of geography as more than a mere compilation 
of facts associated with isolated locations.  According to Blouet, his epistemological 
innovation amounted to “a unifying methodology based on a search for causal 
relations [which was] to be achieved by defining geography as the science of the 
interaction between society and the environment.  Thus united, geography was to 
bridge the gap between the science and the humanities.  He rejected environmental 
determinism.”14  Furthermore, Mackinder’s new geography pivoted on the use of 
particularizing and generalizing strategies of inquiry,15 not merely emphasizing 
 
13 This synthesis has not been without its critics; “Classical geopolitics is a form of geopolitical 
discourse that seeks to repress its own politics and geography, imaging itself as beyond 
politics and above situated geographies in a transcendent Olympian realm of surveillance and 
judgment.”  Quoted in P. Kelly, “A Critique of Critical Geopolitics,” Geopolitics, vol. 11, no. 1, 
p. 37.  See, also, G. OTuathail and S. Dalby, eds., Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 
1998).   
14 Brian Blouet, Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 35 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), p. 649. 
15 See, John R. Hall and Robert Bierstedt, “Toynbee and Sociology,” in Power and Progress 
(New York: McGraw–Hill Inc., 1974), pp. 73-86. 
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specific locations and events, but also vigorously deployed comparative 
methodologies through time and across space. 16 
Mackinder developed an inductive approach that underscored the probability 
of his conclusions.  This reasoning was open to further questions by the means of 
recognizing new, relevant evidence,17 such as the importance of “manpower”—a 
term he coined18—mobilized by continental-sized states and the deleterious potential 
of what he termed the social “organizers,” who might exploit the misery of those 
citizens whose economic prospects were blighted by prolonged unemployment.  
Mackinder, posed a pivotal question: “Are we not frequently in danger of founding 
policy on a consideration of the means of life rather than of life itself? I propose 
asking you to turn for a while from thought of values, and even of wealth itself, to 
the output of human energy for which wealth affords but part of the fuel.”19   
He identified two divergent approaches to this problem: the first was an 
abstract, theoretical discussion of the sources of human energy and an assessment of 
the economic and political conditions in which human energy is realized; the second 
was an examination of the British empire and other empires with principles 
developed “on the way.” 
There was also a progressive dimension to Mackinder’s understanding of 
manpower that continues to apply to the issues of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century Western democracies.  He wrote:  
 
 
16 Scholars have either attacked Mackinder for offering up false predictions or integrated his 
geopolitical assessments into other, non-spatial schools of international relations.  For 
instance, S. Pelizza in The Geopolitics of International Reconstruction: Halford Mackinder and Eastern 
Europe, 1919-1920, The International Review, vol. 38, no. 1, 2016, p. 191 argued that “modern 
scholars and statesmen should be wary of seeking Mackinder’s geopolitical guidance on 
current international affairs because contrary to conventional wisdom, history did not always 
prove him right. It also proved him spectacularly wrong, especially on Eastern Europe in the 
aftermath of the First World War.”  International Relations theorists have located Mackinder 
in the wider framework of the literature of that subject [i.e., Mackinder] “used his 
understanding of geopolitics to support the League of Nations as a means of transcending the 
awful realities of a world based on realpolitik.  In this sense he shares with Carr and 
Morgenthau a desire to find an alternative to the grim logic of power.” L. M. Ashworth, 
“Realism and the spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, geopolitics and the reality of the league 
of Nations,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 17, no. 2, 2010 pp. 279-301. 
17 There is a close congruence in Mackinder’s approach to the ontology of classical geopolitics 
as described by P. Kelly in “A Critique of Critical Geopolitics,” Geopolitics, vol. 11, no. 1, 2006, 
p. 26: “The classical modernist ontological perspective finds reality ‘out there’ and distinct 
from the observer, thus making an objective approach possible, and its epistemological stance 
favors the empirical, logical, and intuitive formulations of facts into theory based on 
probability.” 
18 See, H.J. Mackinder, “Man–power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength,” The 
National Review, vol. 45, 1905, pp. 136-143. 
19 Mackinder, “Man–power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength,” p. 136. 
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The idea of the minimum wage, at the root of both trade–unionism and 
socialism, is inspired by the idea of economizing man-power.  Every great 
irregularity of employment, whether due to foreign competition, trade 
disputes, shortage of raw materials, or failure of employers, involves 
terrible wreckage of the capital fixed in humanity; in other words a 
‘scrapping’ of manpower.20  
 
His vision of a new political economy for Great Britain and its empire 
encompassed more than just a demand for a minimum wage: “Mackinder wanted to 
improve British ‘manpower’ through protectionism, better working class housing and 
education, and a minimum wage . . .  He lambasted laissez-faire policy for letting 
London suck the life out of the country.”21   
He claimed, in short, that the strength of a nation lay in “its workers, its 
thinkers, its fighters, and its mothers.”  In emphasizing how to enhance the 
manpower of Britain and the British empire, Mackinder was attempting to find a way 
to guarantee that the empire would maintain its relative power position vis-à-vis the 
new territorial and technologically sophisticated powers, such as Germany, the 
United States, and even Russia, the first two of which were overtaking Great Britain 
in industrial productivity and the third, which had the potential to do so provided the 
Eurasian steppes were fully covered by a railway network that could readily access 
mineral and agricultural resources. 
His concern in Democratic Ideals and Reality for the growth of a territorial 
power resting on the resources of the Eurasian steppes had an historical antecedent 
in his 1904 paper titled “The Geographical Pivot of History.”22  Mackinder’s book 
“applied the 1904 concept of the pivot area to the compelling circumstances of a real 
crisis, but only Mackinder could see that the situation remained critical.”23   
The “pivot area” (of 1904) of the Eurasian steppes was relabeled the 
heartland in 1919. According to the strict geographic definition of the heartland, the 
Eurasian steppe area under consideration was inaccessible to maritime commerce and 
sea power.  He amended this strict geographic definition by offering a broader, 
strategic definition that comported with the military events of World War I and its 
aftermath.  Based on his concept of the heartland, he made several bold predictions 
that set him apart from the accepted consensus of the day, most controversially that 
the conflict that had just ended in 1918 was little more than a pyrrhic victory, one 
that had not resolved the key political and strategic relationship between Germany 
(and the Germanic diaspora through eastern Europe) and Russia (and the Slavic 





20 Mackinder, “Man–power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength,” p. 142. 
21 P. Tinline, “How to Rule the World,” New Statesman, vol. 148, Feb. 1-7, 2019, p. 48. 
22 See, H.J. Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Journal, vol. 23, no. 
4 (April 1904)  
23 W.H. Parker, Mackinder Geography as an aid to Statecraft (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 
164.    
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The title of the first chapter in Democratic Ideals and Reality is “Perspective.”  
Mackinder’s perspective was a global one, with localities compared and juxtaposed in 
the context of a worldwide scale of analysis.  The First World War was compared and 
contrasted with other great wars of history; it was characterized as “a cataract in the 
stream of history.”s24  Mackinder wondered why great wars occur about every 
hundred years. They are the “outcome, direct or indirect, of the unequal growth of 
nations, and that unequal growth is not wholly due to the greater genius and energy 
of some nations as compared with others; in large measure it is the result of the 
uneven distribution of fertility and strategical opportunity upon the face of the globe. 
In other words, there is in nature no such thing as equality of opportunity for the 
nations.”25   
The challenge for the future was to grade the “stream bed of future history 
as that there shall be no more cataracts.”  If war was to be prevented in the future, 
there had to be a recognition of certain geographical realities, and states had to be 
willing to engage with the challenges these realities brought forth.  He rejected the 
Darwinian theory that assumed “those forms of organization should survive which 
adapted themselves best to their natural environment.”  In claiming that human 
victory consists of rising above this fatalism, Mackinder was not skeptical about 
democracy’s ideals; instead, he sought to reconcile those ideals with geopolitical 
realities. 
The challenge was clearly stated “how we may best adjust our ideals of 
freedom to these lasting realities of our earthly home.”26  This led to an examination, 
in the second chapter, of the tendencies of human nature and how they manifested 
themselves in political and social organizations. 
For Mackinder, humans are creatures of habit.  When arrayed according to 
the precepts of the “division and coordination of labor,” men create societies, 
political organizations, economic corporations, religious institutions, etc.—which in 
the modern era typically engage in specialization of function, coordination through 
markets, and interaction via habitual activities.  Should mundane difficulties arise 
through the everyday division of labor, humans attempt to overcome their difficulties 
through coping.  
Societies have what Mackinder termed “momentum,” an engineering 
concept including not only mass and velocity, but also directionality.  Geopolitical 
analysis thus depends, in no small measure, on an appreciation of population size, 
speed of change through technological and organizational innovation, coupled with 
the strategic capabilities and the intentions of leadership. 
Mackinder characterized the managers of society, the “Going Concern,” as 
two categories of organizers.  The first was an administrator whose function was “to 
keep the running social machine in repair.”  Mackinder argued that they are not really 
“begetters” of new organs of political organization; instead, their reforms were 
 
24 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 1.  
25 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 2. 
26 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 4.   
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carried out incrementally and bureaucratically.  He called the second type of 
organizer a “creator of social mechanism,” the essential features of which emerged as 
a consequence of the French and Bolshevik revolutions.   
While democratic idealism may prompt a revolution, Mackinder claimed that 
idealism does not flourish in the midst of revolutions.  The revolutionary organizer 
was a realist, whose actions were grounded in the ways, means, and foreseeable and 
desired consequences.  The reordering of manpower was one of his tools in 
reordering society to serve the purposes of the state.  This kind of organizer was 
ultimately antithetical to the values of democracy.  “The thought of the organizer is 
essentially strategical, whereas that of the true democrat is ethical.  The organizer is 
thinking how to use men; but the democrat is thinking of the rights of man, which 
rights are so many rocks in the way of the organizer.”27   Mackinder would shortly 
witness firsthand the Bolshevik reorganization of Russian society as the British 
representative to the White Russians in south Russia.  
Two years after Democratic Ideals and Reality was published, Mackinder 
articulated in greater detail the new dangers that had emerged in the aftermath of 
World War I.  “We had not only spanned the oceans and continents, reduced the 
time of communication, but we had also increased in the most wonderful way the 
power of retailing personality, whether through the newspaper or by film, with the 
result that a man at the other side of the world might speak or make grimaces to a 
million on this side.  The power of organizers had increased, so that it was the prime 
danger to humanity.”28  In a practical sense, through the efficacy of transport and 
communication, the creators of social mechanisms henceforth cast a universal gaze 
on the world.29  Mackinder implied that reorganizing this or that nation-state would 
henceforth be a jumping off point for regional, even global restructuring.   
Mackinder then articulated two contentious propositions about the nature of 
democratic and autocratic states.  First, democracies have an ambivalent relationship 
with strategic thinking; second, their idealism often propels them to intervene abroad.  
According to Mackinder, “Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until 
compelled to do so for purposes of defense.  That, of course, does not prevent 
democracy from declaring war for an ideal, as was seen during the French revolution.  
One of the inconsistencies of our pacifists today is that they often urge intervention 
in the affairs of other nations.”30  Such a combination—intervention motivated by 
ideals but devoid of thinking systematically about means, ends, ways, and 
consequences—is not without risk.   
He ended this chapter on social momentum on how he was going to 
understand the realities of international politics that would have a practical utility that 
impelled action.  To accomplish this goal, he divided the world into sea powers and 
land powers, thereby suggesting that the societies that occupy these two 
 
27 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, pp. 15-16. 
28 The Times, July 11, 1921, quoted in W.H. Parker, Mackinder Geography as an Aid to Statecraft 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press ,1987), pp. 82-83.   
29 I am grateful to my colleague Dr. Andreas Beneke for this insight. 
30 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 23. 
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fundamentally different environments have divergent social momentum and strategic 
interests.  
  
Sea Power versus Land Power 
 
In the subsequent chapters 3 and 4, Mackinder developed a dichotomy of 
sea power and land power.  This dichotomy was based on the fact that sea powers 
historically had relied on buoyancy and, prior to the mechanization of sea transport, 
wind power in order to project force; whereas land powers had projected force via 
overland travel.  There is a congruence between Mackinder and Thucydides, who 
emphasized the adversarial relationship between the two.  
In developing this aspect of geopolitical thought, Mackinder broke new 
intellectual ground by describing how the relationship between these two approaches 
had changed over time, not merely in the case of one confrontation, e.g. between 
Athens and Sparta, but from the history of the ancient Mediterranean to World War 
I.  Furthermore, the new sociological and economic dimensions he had identified 
(i.e., going concerns, social momentum, markets, etc.) required a synthetic 
interpretation, which he developed using history, geography, and strategy.   
Mackinder’s interpretation assumed that the practical implications of the 
geographic reality of the unity of the oceans had not been understood until the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  Why was this?  He believed that the influence of 
geography on human activities depended not merely on the physical facts of 
geography, but also required men to imagine the reality of oceanic unity.  Both 
objective facts and subjective appreciations mattered for a full geopolitical 
assessment the strategic interactions of a particular historical epoch. 
He claimed that “each century has its own geographical perspective” and 
that the geographical perspective of the twentieth century would likely differ from 
that of previous and future periods.  His understanding of the geographic perspective 
operating at the beginning of the twentieth century was peerless.  “Whether we think 
of the physical, economic, military or political interconnection of things on the 
surface of the globe, we are now for the first time presented with a closed system.  
The known does not fade any longer through the half-known into the unknown.”31  
Every “deed of humanity” would be “echoed and re-echoed” around the globe.  This 
realization enabled Mackinder to explain the rapid horizontal escalation of World 
War I into a truly global conflict.  He wrote, “That, in the ultimate analysis, is why 
every considerable state was bound to be drawn into the recent war, if it lasted, as it 
did last long enough.”32   
In this closed global system, the relative efficiency of states and economic 
organizations became a more important prerequisite for the effective exercise of 
power than territorial conquest.  Seapowers, for example, now had the potential to 
project military power ashore on an unprecedented scale.   
 
31 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 29. 
32 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 30. 
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Another dimension that had underpinned the war of 1914-1919 and gave it 
global consequences was a process of diffusion of the industrial revolution based on 
the utilization of coal and iron.  This process unfolded in a unique manner for each 
state. England, a maritime power, and France and Germany, land powers, underwent 
industrialization in divergent socio-economic contexts.   For instance, the former 
advanced a laissez-faire economic position, whereas the Germans adopted 
mercantilism.  The growth in the Eurasian railway network, Mackinder believed, was 
leading to an inland extension of a pre-existing global maritime market.   
With the development of railway transport, strategic thinkers could imagine 
extending the geographical scope of conflict by mobilizing men and materiel on an 
unprecedented scale.  Policymakers could now plan to project military power to 
locations that would have been unthinkable in the nineteenth century.  For the first 
time, global dominance was imagined as a realistic strategic objective.  
Mackinder articulated the enduring principles of the relationship between sea 
power and land power by developing several case studies that took account of unique 
geographical patterns of political history.  The first examined the “square of water 
between Europe and Asia”—the Aegean Sea—in which the island of Crete was the 
“largest and most fruitful” of the Aegean islands.   Whether or not Crete was “first 
base of sea-power” was of less importance to Mackinder than the fact that “the man–
power of the sea must be nourished by land fertility somewhere, and other things 
being equal— such as security of the home and energy of the people—that power 
will control the sea which is based on the greater resources.”33  Accordingly, 
Mackinder argued that the manpower devoted to the projection of force overseas 
depended on having a productive and secure territorial base.   
However, such bases were vulnerable to the depredations of, or conquest by, 
neighboring land powers.  After having assessed the strategy of the failed Persian 
attempt to conquer the Hellenic Aegean world and the classic case of land versus sea 
power conflict between Sparta and Athens, Mackinder focused on the efforts of the 
Macedonians, who having conquered the Greek Peninsular, proceeded to march  
 
into Asia, and through Syria into Egypt, and on the way destroying Tyre of 
the Phoenicians.  Thus they made a “closed sea” of the Eastern 
Mediterranean by depriving both the Greeks and the Phoenicians of their 
bases.  That done, the Macedonian King Alexander could advance light-
heartedly into Upper Asia.34  
  
The Macedonians thus altered the operation of the ancient Mediterranean by 
disrupting the maritime competition between the Greeks and the Phoenicians, each 
of which had attempted to advance a commercial network by sending forth colonists.  
Mackinder derived his second timeless principle from this case. “[W]ithout the 
protection of a navy commerce moved securely over a water-way because all the 
shores were held by one and the same land power.”35 
 
33 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 34.  
34 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 35. 
35 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 37. 
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Mackinder’s second case study was the entire Mediterranean.  A 
consequence of Rome’s conquest of Carthage during the Third Punic War meant that 
Rome turned the Western Mediterranean into a “closed sea” since all of its shores 
were now held by one land-power.  After the Battle of Actium, Rome extended its 
control over the eastern Mediterranean.36   
Thus, for the next five centuries, the Roman Empire remained at its core a 
land empire: “No fleet was needed, save a few police vessels, to maintain as complete 
a command of the arterial sea-way of the Mediterranean.”37  The implication of this 
analysis is that a closed sea had the surprising consequence of reducing the need for a 
war fleet in those waters, freeing resources for other potential theaters of maritime 
conflict should the need arise. 
Mackinder was not a geographic determinist.  These geographical patterns 
were mutable depending on successful political or military action.  In describing the 
forces that led to subsequent change, he noted how the Norsemen raided over the 
North Sea, through the English Channel and the Straits of Gibraltar into the 
Mediterranean.  Forward bases were established in the islands of the British 
archipelago and Sicily.  Simultaneously, the Saracens of Arabia captured Egypt and 
Syria and conquered the southern shores of the Mediterranean.  They annexed parts 
of Sicily and Spain for their overseas bases and proceeded to build fleets.   
Consequently, the competition between land and sea power may at different 
times produce varying outcomes. During the Roman Empire, the Mediterranean was 
a “closed sea” in which commerce was protected via the exercise of land power along 
its entire littoral.  Yet, while Christian Europe and Islam fought for maritime 
dominance in the Mediterranean, it was no longer “closed.”  In the words of one 
commentator, Mackinder was creating “a conceptually robust geopolitical model for 
theorizing about the relationships between material contexts and security–political 
arrangements.”38  
In his third case study, Mackinder focused on the maritime tradition of 
Great Britain.  Britain’s position shifted from being located in Europe’s “peninsular 
mainland” during the Middle Ages, to the point where Britain was able to envelope 
and contain the peninsula mainland by means of the strategic deployment of its sea 
power.  This development reached its apogee after the defeat of the French and their 
Spanish allies at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.  
Mackinder argued that the constituent elements of British sea power were its 
geographical configuration, agricultural fertility, and manpower.  From the Norman 
Conquest to the beginning of the industrial revolution, these factors had a specific 
geographical context:  “One fertile plain between the mountains of the west and 
 
36 This battle took place in 31 BC off the western coast of Greece. The Roman leader 
Octavius Caesar defeated a combined fleet of Mark Antony and the Egyptian Queen 
Cleopatra. One of the consequences of this battle was the annexation of Egypt as a Roman 
province.     
37 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 39. 
38 Daniel Deudney, “Geopolitics as Theory: Historical Security Materialism,” European Journal 
of International Relations, vol. 6, no.1, 2000 p. 80. 
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north and the narrow seas to the east and south, a people of farmers, a single king, a 
single parliament, a tidal river, a single great city for central market and port.”39   
The technological and organizational characteristics of British sea power may 
have changed over the centuries, but Britain’s insular position allowed intervention in 
European military conflicts in a fashion and at a timing of its own choosing.  The 
productive and secure home base along the Thames River valley, supplemented in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century by other locations in the British Isles,40 was the 
sine qua non of Britain’s ability to sustain itself as a major maritime power. 
 
The Great War 
 
Mackinder then applied his analytical framework to the course of the Great 
War, dividing the conflict into two phases: the first from 1914 to 1917 and the 
second from 1917 to the end of the war.  During the first phase, the war fought in 
the old style with the Royal and French Navies taking “command of the ocean” and 
enveloping the European peninsula land theater of the war.  From this position, 
Great Britain projected and sustained an expeditionary force41 into France and 
provisioned France with vital raw materials. Russia provided a second front, one that 
distracted Imperial Germany from directing all of its land-based efforts against 
France and sea forces against the British fleet in the North Sea. 
What was absent from Mackinder’s analysis was an appreciation of the 
disruptive effect of the U-boat, a new technology that threatened the supply routes 
crossing the North Atlantic from Canada and the United States.  Furthermore, he 
neglected to mention that the defeat of this threat had been brought about by the 
introduction of oceanic convoys as an element of coherent anti–submarine warfare 
tactics, and with the entry of the United States into the war.42  
According to Mackinder, America’s entry into the war combined with 
Imperial Russia’s withdrawal from the conflict in 1917 changed the war aims and 
“world strategy” of the conflict.  By the end of World War I, sea power had laid siege 
to land power and the strategic objective was unambiguously to make the world a 
safer place for democracies.  Mackinder interpreted the war as having ultimately been 
a conflict between “Islanders” and “Continentals.”   
To further substantiate this claim, Mackinder predicted that North America 
would come to be understood in a geopolitical sense not as a continent, but as an 
island.  He thought that the American political class would no longer think of itself as 
standing apart from European and even Asian or African affairs, particularly as naval 
power had come to envelop what Mackinder perceived to be a World Island of the 
three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa.  He assumed that the imperatives of 
World War I would bring about a revolution in the imagination and policies of the 
American elite; he failed to appreciate the interwar American desire for a revival of 
 
39  Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p.. 54. 
40 For example, the Clyde and Sunderland and Liverpool being important for shipbuilding. 
41 The British Expeditionary Force. 
42 S.R. Dunn, Bayley’s War: The Battle of the Western Approaches in the First World War (Barnsley: 
Seaforth Publishing, 2018).    
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the isolationism the North Atlantic had originally inspired.  What the First World 
War failed to achieve, the Second World War brought home to the American elite 
with a vengeance: the United States, as the unambiguous superpower in the post-
World War II era, could no longer ignore events occurring across the World Island.  
The emblematic event that confirmed Mackinder’s post-World War I assumption was 
the founding of North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) in 1949. 
Chief among those events was the emergence of the potential threat to 
maritime power emanating from the continental power occupying the Eurasian 
heartland.  To understand the landsman’s point of view, he suggested “brigading” 
geographic details into general categories of strategic significance.  His departure 
point was the inaccessible coast of northern Russia. There, three of the largest rivers 
in the world, the Lena, Yenisei, and Ob, flowed northwards through Siberia into the 
Arctic. South of Siberia, he identified other regions in which rivers drained into 
inland lakes, the most prominent of which were the Caspian and Aral Seas.  The 
crucial strategic point was that the whole area was inaccessible to oceanic navigation 
and had been dominated by horse-riding nomads who had frequently attacked and 
laid waste to Eastern Europe.   
However, with the opening up of this area by railways and aviation, a 
revolution in geopolitics was occurring.  Specifically, these changes in transport and 
travel would, according to Mackinder, potentially provide the power occupying this 
vast stretch of territory access to resources and a concomitant expansion in man-
power, the material sinews of national power. 
It was in this chapter on the landsman’s perspective that Mackinder coined 
the concept of the heartland, which represented a revised version of Mackinder’s 
1904 conceptualization of the geographic “pivot.” Torjorn Knutsen has suggested 
that it represented an expanded version of “the pivot of 1904.”43  As a consequence 
of World War I, Mackinder came to appreciate that his original formulation did not 
account for the territorial ambitions of those powers engaged in that conflict.  He 
amended his formulation to encompass strategic intentions and actions of the 
combatants on the eastern front:  
 
The heartland for the purposes of strategical thinking includes the Baltic 
Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, 
Armenia, Persia, Tibet and Mongolia.  Within it therefore were 
Brandenburg-Prussia, and Austria Hungary, as well as Russia—a vast triple 
base of manpower, which was lacking to the horse-riders of history. The 
heartland is the region to which, under modern conditions; sea-power can 
be refused access, though the western part of it lies without the region of 
Arctic and Continental drainage.44 
 
 
43 Torbjorn L. Knutsen, “Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis,” The 
International History Review, vol 36, no. 5, 2014, p. 841. 
44 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 110. 
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The strategic delineation of the heartland is of paramount importance as it reflects 
Mackinder’s appreciation of how an alliance of powers occupying the Eurasian 
steppes interacted with the key regions on its periphery. 
Mackinder deemed two smaller regions on the heartland’s periphery of 
demographic importance, describing them as the “most important in the globe.”  The 
first region was the Mediterranean and the European peninsula and off-shore islands.  
The second was the southern and eastern coastlands of Asia.  In 1919, their 
combined population was 800 million people.  Mackinder then advanced the 
following geopolitical proposition: “four fifths of the population of the Great 
Continent, the World Island, live in two regions which together measure only one 
fifth of its area.”45  Two key factors pertained to both of these regions:  their rivers 
were navigable from the ocean and climatic conditions allowed these regions to 
sustain large populations.  These were the “regions of the plowmen and shipmen.” 
For Mackinder, the heartland had a greater connectivity with Europe and 
Arabia than with China or India.  He believed that a power or an alliance of powers 
occupying the heartland might secure sufficient resources to construct a fleet that 
would effectively control the Baltic and Black Seas,46 turning these seas into closed 
bodies of water, and to provide secure bases from which to contest the control of the 
high seas.  Thus, new transport and weapons technology could expand the 
geographical scope of the heartland.  Given the speed of technological change, he 
articulated an insightful strategic analysis:  
 
Today armies have at their disposal not only the trans-continental 
railway, but also the motor car.  They have, too, the aeroplane, 
which is of a boomerang nature, a weapon of land-power as against 
sea-power. . . . In short, a great military power in possession of the 
heartland, and of Arabia, could take easy possession of the 
crossways of the world at Suez.  Sea power would have found it very 
difficult to hold the Canal if a fleet of submarines had been based 
from the beginning of the war on the Black Sea.47  
 
Mackinder’s proposals for reconstructing Europe after World War I advocated 
keeping Russia contained in the heartland and to limit the power of Germany to 
expand territorially into the heartland.  
Mackinder recognized that the conflict between Great Britain and Imperial 
Germany was the most recent manifestation of the recurring contest between naval 
and land-based powers in European history.  The proximate cause for World War I, 
according to Mackinder, was the ethnic competition and conflict between the Slavic 
peoples of Eastern Europe and the Germans who migrated into those regions and 
settled in their midst.  Thus, a post-war territorial settlement would have to address 
 
45 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 83. 
46 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 109.  
47  Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 111. 
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the “fundamental antagonism between the Germans, who wished to be Masters in 
East Europe, and the Slavs, who refused to submit to them.”48 
 
Reconstruction: Domestic and International 
 
In the concluding chapters of Democratic Ideals and Reality, Mackinder 
discussed how the ideals of democracy might be squared with geopolitical realities. 
Some recommendations were too idealistic (e.g., the suggestion that nation-states 
forgo economic policies that might lead to unbalanced national economic growth).  
This suggestion applied to both laissez-faire and mercantilist economies.  He 
identified the intense rivalry between regimes promoting market-centric versus state-
centric approaches to economic development in the years leading up to the First 
World War.  This was a trans-historical problem for which he had no practical 
solution.  A similar failure can be discerned in his response to the threat of socialists 
advancing a manifesto of the proletariat as a class and capitalists advancing the 
special interests of producers gaining control of the state.  
He argued that equality among nations can only be achieved “from within as 
well as from without.”  In short, domestic politics had to be conducted with an 
understanding of its effect on foreign policy.  This contention had several  
implications, the most important of which was that nations must, if they were to 
survive, be based on local communities within them.  He cited the old English idea 
of the House of Commons: “the House of Communities—shires and burghs—
would be the modern translation”49  
Mackinder saw the real challenge as the need to prevent “class and interest” 
from cutting across localities.  How was this to be done?  He asserted that since 
“organization based on local communities is essential to the stable and therefore 
peaceable life of nations, then those local communities must have as complete and 
balanced a life of their own as is compatible with the life of the nation itself.”50  
 Only by altering these going concerns—economic, social, and political 
domestic institutions of nation-states—might peace be assured. 
 Mackinder summarized his fears for the post-war world by coining a 
geopolitical catechism that would become the most controversial and remembered 
aspect of the whole book: 
 
When our statesmen are in conversation with the defeated enemy, 
some airy cherub should whisper to them from time to time this 
saying: 
 
Who rules East Europe controls the heartland: 
Who rules the heartland commands the World-Island: 
 
48 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 124. 
49 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 184. 
50 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 186. 
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Who rules the World-Island commands the World. 51  
   
How to forestall this eventuality was central to his proposed reconstruction of 
Europe.  Mackinder understood that the peace talks would advance a new democratic 
ideal.  The creation of the League of Nations that, by advancing collective security 
arrangements among juridically equal and sovereign states, would bring about a 
European-wide peace.  This new ideal had seized the imagination of many.  It 
became, in effect, an ideological force to be reckoned with, just as the slogan 
“Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” had previously motivated so many during the 
French Revolution and the goal of national autonomy had during the revolutions of 
1848.  To give the proposed League a reasonable chance of success, Mackinder 
recommended the division of Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
into smaller, more compact nation-states, each of which would become its own going 
concern. 
He claimed that “there should be a tier of independent States between 
Germany and Russia.”52  These newly independent states would be populated by 
ethnic groups that had been submerged within the territories of Imperial Germany 
and Austria-Hungary.  Mackinder’s map displayed a tier of states stretching from the 
Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea in north to the Adriatic Sea, encompassing some 
of the European nations that had won their independence from the Ottoman 
Empire—another ally of the defeated Central Powers.  
 
Between the Baltic and the Mediterrainean you have these seven non-
German peoples, each on the scale of a European State of the second 
rank—the Poles, the Bohemians (Czechs and Slovaks), the Hungarians 
(Magyars), the South Slavs (Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes), the 
Rumanians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks.53 
 
 
51 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 150. 
52 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 158. 
53 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p 159. 
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The map depicting the borders of this “Middle Tier of States” was crudely drawn, 
and he conceded that it was merely illustrative of the means by which the separation 
of Germany from Russia might be achieved.  Mackinder regarded this separation as a 
necessity. 
He produced a demographic analysis of these proposed states in order to 
demonstrate that, once organized as independent entities, they were a force with 
which to be reckoned—provided several conditions were met.  First, they needed to 
be economically integrated via a rail system from the Baltic to the Adriatic; second, 
they must remain vigilant in defense of their interest in remaining free from German 
and Russian political depredations and economic penetration; and, third, the Western 
powers, the United Kingdom and France, should extend an alliance to these 
countries to insure their continued independence and security.   
Once allied with the Western maritime powers, these new nation-states 
would help restore the balance of power and provide a foundation for the operations 
of a League of Nations.  In effect, this tier of new states would operate as a buffer 
between a Germany seeking one day in the future to revive its expansionary project 
and the Soviet Union, which might want to spread its revolution to the lands along 
its borders. 
Collective security, the new normative democratic ideal, was in Mackinder’s 
estimation a poor basis for securing peace unless firmly established on geopolitical 
realities.  The first requirement was to establish the buffer states separating Germany 
from the Soviet Union.  These new “going concerns” would secure their own 
interests by remaining autonomous political entities, divorced from their more 
powerful neighbors and allied with the Western maritime powers.  He sought to 
weave together the three foundations of a modern international order: collective 
security through a League of Nations, the ideal of national self-determination as 
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described by President Woodrow Wilson, and the traditional means of off-shore 
maritime naval power, by which the United Kingdom had secured peace on the 
continent of Europe by rebalancing  power as necessitated by changing circumstance.  
However, the Treaty of Versailles—that dismantled Imperial Germany and the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and established a tier of independent states—had less to 
do with Mackinder’s recommendations than with the immediate desire by the victors 
to punish the vanquished. Nevertheless, this buffer area between Germany and the 
Russian Federation continues to exercise the geopolitical imagination in the twenty-
first century.  Mackinder wrote to address the immediate crisis of his time, but his 
categories of analysis and method of thought has an enduring significance. 
 
Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 Many scholars and policymakers today acknowledge the extraordinary 
contribution that Mackinder made to geographic methods and geopolitical 
understanding.  He is one of the giants on whose shoulders subsequent geopolitical 
thinkers during the twentieth century stood.54  The 1904 essay, “The Geographic 
Pivot,” and the 1919 book, Democratic Ideals and Reality, provided a vantage point from 
which to envision local and regional developments in a worldwide context.  In 
recognizing the threat that a territorially consolidated heartland posed for maritime 
powers, Mackinder placed in bold relief the geopolitical imperatives to counter the 
territorial ambitions of Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union.  It 
took two global conflicts and the Cold War to prevent Mackinder’s prediction: the 
consolidation of the world-island under the control of a heartland power.   
 A polymath, such as Mackinder, attracted critics—especially ideologically 
motivated ones.  One academic has claimed that Mackinder was not sufficiently 
liberal to be included at Versailles as a geographic expert for the British delegation;55 
another charged that Mackinder did not free himself from his own ideological biases, 
thus his claim to having a “transcendent Olympian … judgment” was suspect.56  A 
third critic argued that Mackinder’s predictions were simply wrong;57 a fourth insisted 
that modern modes of communication, such as the internet, had negated geography 
as a factor in international relations;58 a fifth has noted that one of Mackinder’s 
 
54 For a history of this expression, see, R.K. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean 
Postscript (New York: Harcourt, 1985).  
55 G. Kearns in “Imperial Geopolitics,” in J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Toal, eds., A 
Companion to Political Geography (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), pp. 176-177. 
56 P. Kelly, A Critique of Critical Geopolitics in Geopolitics, vol. 11, no. 1, 2006 p. 37.  See, also, G. 
OTuathail and S. Dalby, eds., Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1998); G. Kerns, 
Halford Mackinder and the Geographical Pivot of History, vol. 170, no. 4, Dec. 2004, p. 342; and C. 
Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 24. 
57 S. Pelizza in “The Geopolitics of International Reconstruction; “Halford Mackinder and 
Eastern Europe, 1919-1920,” The International Review, vol. 38, no. 1, 2016, p. 191. 
58 See,C.J. Fetweiss, Sir Halford Mackinder, geopolitics ,and policymaking in the 21st century, 
Parameters, vol 30,no 2(Summer 20000 pp58-71.    
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historical observations has been undermined by subsequent research;59 and the 
British Conservative Politician Leo Amery claimed that Democratic Ideals and Reality 
had no policy impact in Britain or the United States. Amery wrote, “Mackinder’s 
views attracted little attention in the Anglo-Saxon world where they were treated as 
fanciful exercises of the academic imagination, but they were studied closely in 
Germany and formed the basis of General Haushofer’s Geopolitik.”60   
What is of paramount importance for our understanding of international 
relations is this: geopolitical thinkers in the West, Russia and the People’s Republic of 
China agree on the relevance of Mackinder’s thought.  They recognize its utility for 
forestalling or advancing their respective national geopolitical projects.61  China, in 
conjunction with Russia, is currently promoting mercantilist policies designed to 
parry the Western producers of high-tech products while challenging the principle of 
freedom of navigation in international waterways.  These are necessary for the supply 
of the island allies of the United States off the coast of East Asia.  This anti-Western 
stance aims to change the geopolitical reality through the construction of a number 
of “amphibian ports” 62as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the aim of which is to 
create a new network of strategic and political power. Those who believed that the 
efficacy of Mackinder’s predictions had been vanquished finally with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall could not have accounted for these subsequent developments.  Michael 
Howard, formerly Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University, wrote, 
“Far from the geopolitical fantasies of Halford Mackinder and his disciples being 
proved valid, with the Heartland of the World Island pressing out to control the 
Rimlands, we are seeing instead the communities of the Rimland increasingly 
penetrating and transforming the stagnant Heartland.”63 
In the twenty-first century, neither Russia nor China must worry about the 
heartland ambitions of others as had been the case before Richard Nixon’s policy 
change towards China.  The emerging Sino-Russian alliance challenges the security of 
the West with the reemergence of the heartland as more geographically extensive and 
more logistically integrated in an unprecedented manner.  As noted earlier, 
 
59 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on The Influence of Sea Power on Indian 
History (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1945), p. 23. 
60 L.S. Amery, My Political Life, vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson, 1953), p. 229.   
61 For how one Chinese scholar reinterprets Mackinder and applies his mode of geopolitical 
thinking to China, see, Zhixing Zhang, “China Takes An Expansionist View of Geopolitics,” 
Forbes, Oct. 31, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2017/10/31/china-takes-an-
expansionist-view-of-geopolitics/#60dfc5ce6a52.  I am in debt to Rodger Baker of Stratfor 
for this citation.  And for Russia, Charles Clover, “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The 
Reemergence of Geopolitics, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1999-03-01/dreams-eurasian-heartland-
reemergence-geopolitics. 
62  “They are a confluence of sea, pipeline and land and air transport facilities.”  See, G.R. 
Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2017), pp. 210-
212.   
63 M. Howard, “A Farewell to Arms,” International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 3, 1989, p. 412. 
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Mackinder claimed that each century has its own geographical perspective. The 
twenty-first century is clearly developing a new geographical perspective.  This 
perspective will alter Mackinder’s conception of the heartland and its relevance to 
international politics. 
One potential geographic change is associated with the progression of 
climate change.  A key dimension in Mackinder’s definition and delineation of the 
Eurasian heartland was its landlocked quality due to climatic factors.  Some scientists 
have claimed that this may come to an end as the Arctic ice cap melts and the north 
east passage around Russia’s northern coast opens to shipping for at least for part of 
the year.  Should this occur, the Eurasian heartland is no longer technically a 
“heartland” as Mackinder defined the term.  The Federal Russian Navy may be able 
to project its power into this region to enforce its claims to the untapped resources 
on the Arctic floor. 
The buildup of Russian naval forces in the Arctic, while unforeseen and 
unforeseeable by Mackinder in 1919, presents a potential threat to Canada and the 
United States.  However, the Russians might discover that defending against the 
United States across the Arctic might well strain their finances as they simultaneously 
attempt to project military power overland to the periphery of Eurasia.  Russia would 
then be faced with the dilemma that Imperial Germany never resolved: on the one 
hand, to divert men and resources from the army to build a fleet capable of 
contesting British dominance on the high seas, or, on the other, to concede the 
oceans and maritime commerce to the British to emerge victorious on land against 
Russia and France.  In highlighting this dilemma for Imperial Germany, during 
World War I, Mackinder invites the use of this historical analogy to Russia—a land 
power that might also decide to go to sea. 
In 1919, Mackinder appreciated the willingness of the victorious powers to 
rely on new ideals such as collective security while discounting the geopolitical 
realities.  Many idealists in the Western democracies believed that the League of 
Nations was the means by which peace might be secured.  Mackinder’s admonition in 
his appendix still holds pertinence in the twenty-first century: “The rule of the world 
still rests upon force, notwithstanding the juridical assumption of equality between 
sovereign States, great or small.”  The three realities of international relations—
national self-determination as a bulwark to empire, collective security through 
international institutions, and the balance of power—remain significant features of 
international relations today.  
In the post-1945 period, the United Nations General Assembly became the 
institution for recognizing movements of national self-determination.  The greater 
powers are represented on the Security Council, each having a veto over the UN’s 
actions.  The membership of the Security Council may be reconstituted to reflect the 
relative shift in economic and military power from the Western powers to emerging 
states such as India. 
Finally, no centennial appreciation would be complete without an 
acknowledgment of Mackinder’s impact on United States foreign policy.  It has been 
a long time coming.  However, he understood the trajectory through which an 
observable reality fused with an ideal to become policy: “As so often happens, those 
who have labored, and apparently labored for long without result, find suddenly that 
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their work was far from being without result.  They had sown the seed, but it took a 
storm of rain for the germination and growth of the young plant to crop.”64  
Phil Tinline, a BBC journalist, has argued that “the storm of 
rain,” as far as Mackinder was concerned, was the advent of the Cold 
War: “As America tried to decide how to face a freshly hostile USSR, 
East Coast academics drew on Mackinder’s work and policymakers 
listened.  Through Princeton’s Edward Mead Earle, his ideas reached 
George Kennan, architect of proposals to “contain” the Soviet Union.”65  Henry 
Kissinger has argued that Mackinder’s pertinence extends into the post–Cold War 
era: “Russia, regardless of who governs it, sits astride the territory that Halford 
Mackinder called the geopolitical heartland and is heir to one of the most potent 
imperial traditions.”66  
 In summary, after one hundred years, Sir Halford Mackinder’s ideas 
continue to have explanatory power: Robert Hughes and Jess Heley from 
Aberystwyth University have argued: “The practice of global politics has not changed 
sufficiently for Mackinder’s ideas to be discarded as an analytical tool for exploring 
contemporary geopolitics”67  Most importantly, he identified, long before anyone 
else, the existence of a closed political system in which the struggle for relative 
efficiency would become of defining importance.  
 
 
64 H.J. Mackinder, “Presidential address to the Geographical Association, 1916,” The Geography 
Teacher 1916, p. 6. 
65 P. Tinline, “How to rule the world,” New Statesman, vol. 148, Feb. 1-7, 2019, pp. 48-51.   
66 Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 814.  
67 R.G. Hughes & J. Heley, “Between Man and Nature: The Enduring Wisdom of Sir Halford 
Mackinder,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 38. No. 6, 2015, p. 927. 
